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123 S. Ct. 1398 (2003)
I. Fas
Robert Frederick Garceau ("Garceau") killed Maureen Bautista, his girl-
friend, and Telesforo Bautista, her fourteen-year-old son. A California court
convicted Garceau of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. The
Supreme Court of California denied post-conviction relief, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
On May 12, 1995, Garceau moved for appointment of federal habeas
counsel and a stay of execution in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California.2 The district court granted a forty-five daystayof
execution? On June 26, 1995, the court extended the stay another 120 days and
appointed counseL. Shortlythereafter, the State moved to vacate the staypartly
because, in violation of a local court rule, Garceau had not filed a "specification
of nonfrivolous issues."' Garceau filed the document, and on October 13,1995,
after denying the State's motion, the court ordered Garceau to file a habeas
petition within nine months.
On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA7) became effective! In Linib v Murpi the United States
Supreme Court held that AEDPA would not apply to cases pending in federal
court before AEDPA's effective date.9 Garceau filed his federal habeas applica-
tion in the district court on July2, 1996.'0 Although Garceau filed his application
after AEDPA became effective, the district court decided that, under circuit
precedent, AEDPA did not apply to Garceau's petition for habeas relief." The






7. WoJfm 123 S. C. at 1400; sw Anaiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 US.C 55 2244-2264 (2000))
(amending the procedures for review of habeas corpus petitions in federal court).
8. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
9. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,322-23 (1997).
10. Womfint 123 S. Ca. at 1400.
11. Id
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district court, however, denied Garceau relief on the merits of his habeas claim n1
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cruit also concluded that AEDPA did not
apply to Garceau's application but reversed the district court's denial of habeas
relief and granted Garceau relief on the merits."
I. Hddirg
The United States Supreme Court found that Lir,&h removed a case from
the reach of AEDPA only if the petitioner had an application for habeas relief
on the merits pending before a federal court on the day AEDPA became effec-
tive.' 4 Garceau had filed motions for appointment of counsel, stays of execution,
and a "specification of nonfrivolous issues" before the day AEDPA became
effective but had not yet filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus."5
Therefore, the Court determined that Garceau's application was subject to
AEDPA, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case. 6
IL A rmtjis
The Court held that in light of the statutory language of 28 U.S.C
2254(e)(1), a case should only be considered pending for the purposes of Lit&
once an application for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed.' The Court relied
on the fact that §2254(e)(1) aplplies to proceedings "instituted byan application
for a writ of habeas corpus."' If a habeas case could be commenced by an
application for counsel or a stay, the Court reasoned, the presumption in S
2254(e) (1) would almost never applybecause it affects onlycases commenced by
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, and most federal habeas prisoners first
file an application for a stayor counsel 9 The CouZ decided Congress could not
have meant for an applicant to avoid the stringent requirement of S 2254(e)(1)
simply by first filing an application for a stay of execution or request for
counsel.' As a result, the Court determined that the section only made sense if
all federal habeas proceedings began with an application for a writ of habeas
12. Id at 1400-01.
13. Id at 1401.
14. Id at 1402.
15. Id at 1400.
16. Wcn4btd 123 S. C. at 1403.
17. Id at 1402; see 28 US.C S 2254(e)(1) (2000) (requiring federal courts in federal habeas
proceedings to presume factual findings in state courts were correct; part of AEDPA).
18. Woo4ra7 123 S. Ca. at 1402; se 28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(1) (stating that the statute shall only
apply to proceedings commenced byan application for a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).




corpus.21 Consequently, if a petitioner filed an "application for habeas relief
seeking an adjudication on the nrts of the petitioner's claims" before April 24,
1996, AEDPA would not apply to that petitioner's claim 2  Because Garceau
filed his application for habeas relief after April 24, 1996, the Court held that
AEDPA applied to his case.23
The Court also utilized Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 to support its
holding that a habeas case was not pending until an application for a writ of
habeas corpus had been filed.24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 (a) (2) provides
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas corpus proceedings to
the extent that other statutes do not require different procedural rules." Rule 3
states that a "civil action is commenced by filing a complaint."26 Because no
habeas corpus statute contradicted Ride 3, and an application for a writ of habeas
corpus equates to a complaint in a typical civil case, the Court concluded that a
habeas case begins with the application for habeas relief.27
Garceau argued that the Court's prior holding in McFamanv Scca' dictated
a different result.29 A federal judge may stay any state proceeding when an
application for habeas relief is pending before a federal court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C S 2251.30 In McFadamr the Court held that a motion for appointment of
counsel commenced a federal habeas proceeding and a federal judge could then
invoke S 2251 to stay a state proceeding after such a filing." Therefore, Garceau
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at 1403. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court failed to apply
properly the rule it announced to Garceau's case because she believed Garceau did have an
application before the Court seeking habeas relief on the merits in the form of his "specification
of non-frivolous issues." Id at 1404 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majorkiyresponded that the
document only alerted the district court to potential constitutional issues that might be raised and
actually sought no relief. Id at 1403 n.1.
24. Id at 1402; seFED. R. Cv. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court.").
25. FED. R. CV. P. 8 1(a)(2) (applying the federal rules to habeas corpus proceedings to the
extent they are not inconsistent with another statute).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (describing how a civil action is commenced).
27. Wcr rnr 123 S. CL. at 1402.
28. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
29. Wboia4 123 S. Cc. at 1402-03; se McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 857-58 (1994)
(holding that a request for counsel initites a habeas corpus proceeding, thereby conveying power
to a federal judge to stay the state proceedings, pursuant to 28 US.C S 2251).
30. 28 U.S.C S 2251 (2000) (stating that a"justice or judge of the United States before whom
a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of
discharge, or pending appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or
by or under the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding";
part of AEDPA).
31. Mdcadx4 512 U.S. at 858.
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contended that because the Court in McFadand found that an application for
appointment of counsel began a federal habeas proceeding within the meaning
of S 2251, the Court should find his case was pending after he filed his applica-
tion for counsel for the purpose of applying Lirt. 3
The Court disagreed." The Court first noted that McFadand interpreted
§2251 not §2254. 34 The Court also held that the reasoning in McFaraxi did not
apply to Garceau's case in light of that opinion's special emphasis on protecting
the right to counsel.3 McFariand held that 21 U.S.C S 848(q)(4)(B) grants an
appellant the right to counsel before the appellant files a formal application for
a writ of habeas corpus. 6 The Court noted that unless the district court was able
to staythe state court proceedings, that right to counsel on habeas appeal "would
have been meaningless."' Therefore, the Court in Garceau's case concluded that
McFanani did not apply because of that decision's particular concern with
protecting an appellant's right to counsel after conviction, a concern not present
in Garceau's appeal.3
Garceau made a similar argument based on Hhn v UnitadStats,39 which the
court also distinguished from Garceau's case.4 In Hdn, the Court determined
that a denial of an application for a certificate of appealability ("(DA) could be
appealed to higher courts because the 00A constituted a case as contemplated
by28 U.S.C S 1254(1)."' The Court in Hnnoted that an application for a OA
had all of the characteristics of a case, including adversitybetween the parties and
a request for relief from a redressable injury.42 In Wcar4 the Court noted that
although Han held that an application for a GOA was a "case" for purposes of
entitlement to appellate review, it did not hold that the case was " 'pending'
32. Se Wofo4 123 S. G. at 1402 (stating that according to Garceau the Court's prior
holding in Md'a)Ad"should inform the Court's decision in Wonfoim.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 1403.
36. Mvaarand, 512 US. at 858; se 21 U.S.C S 848(q)(4)(B) (1999) (stating that a defendant
charged with a crime punishable by death is entitled to the services of an attorney before and after
judgment).
37. Madatg 512 US. at 857.
38. Wr*mi 123 S. Q. at 1403.
39. 524 US. 236 (1998).
40. Woo4bo4 123 S. CL at 1403; seeHohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,241 (1998) (holding
that an application for a certificate of appealability constitutes a case).
41. S H*m 524 US. at 241 (holding that an application for a OA constituted a "case"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.CG S 1254(1)); 28 US.C S 1254(1) (2000) (stating that the Supreme
Court may hear cases from a court of appeals after granting a writ of certiorari "upon the petition
of any party to any civil or criminal case").
42. Hbn, 524 US. at 241.
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within the meaning of the L inl nule."43 Therefore, the Court decided that Hchn
shed no light on whether a case was pending for purposes of applying the L ir&
rule."
IV. Appi in mVigmza
The holding of Wbaf4d affects the small class of state prisoners who had
not yet filed their applications for a writ of habeas corpus with a district court by
AEDPA's effective date but had filed some of their habeas-related motions in a
federal district court prior to April 24,1996. Generally, commentators agree that
AEDPA greatly reduces the chance that a state prisoner will find relief from the
writ.45 In particular, AEDPA allows a federal judge to issue a writ of habeas
corpus onlyif the state court's decision was contraryto, or unreasonablyapplied,
federal law as dearly established by the Supreme Court.' Before AEDPA,
federal courts were free to grant a writ of habeas corpus if a state decision
violated any applicable federal law.47 AEDPA also imposed greater procedural
burdens on federal habeas applicants and curtailed a federal court's abilityto find
facts contraryto a state court's findings.48 If there are inmates who filed some
motions prior to April 24, 1996, in anticipation of filing applications for a writ
of habeas corpus, but who had not yet filed their applications, theywill be forced
to proceed under the more daunting post-AEDPA review of their habeas
petitions.
Woufan also clarifies under what circumstances the Supreme Court will
likelyfind that a federal habeas proceeding is "pending." Bycarefullydistinguish-
ing its holding in McFad4 the Court in Woaofa strongly implied that
McFadadr retained its prior vitality.49 Therefore, the state of the law after Wod-
fiid appears to be that a federal habeas case is pending when an applicant files an
application for a writ of habeas corpus for purposes of applying the rule in Lir&,
but a federal habeas proceeding is pending aer an applicant merely moves for
43. Wonfon4 123 S. Ct. at 1403.
44. Id
45. S 17ACiARLEs ALANWRIGHrARTHURR. MILLER &EDWARDH OPER, FEDERAL
PRACTCEAND PROCEDURES 4261.1, at 57 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) (stating that AEDPArestricts, but
does not eliminate, habeas corpus).
46. 28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000) (stating that a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas
corpus unless the state court's decision "was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court of the United States").
47. WRIGHT, s"pra note 45, at 58-59.
48. Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond, 7he In e Shi ing Writ Habeas Corpus Uir te A nrz
TmuismandEffiiDthPe- iyActrj1996, 9 CAP. DEF.J. 52, 53-55 (1996).
49. Se WoafbuA 123 S. CL at 1403 (emphasizing the differences between Wontd and
McFar/rd as a reason why the holding in McFadard did not applyto Woofo.
2003]
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appointment of counsel or a stay for the purposes of applying 28 U.S.C S 2251
and 21 U.S.C S 848(q)(4)(b).50
The principal distinction between McFadardand Woaxfd appears to be the
fundamental right the Court sought to protect in the underlying claim. Whereas
McFadmad dealt with an important aspect of a habeas petitioner's constitutional
right to counsel, Wo d only concerned an applicant's desire to avoid the
stricter requirements of AEDPA. 1 While this is an important issue to the
appellant, it has far less systemic importance than the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Court did not specifically address whether it would find a habeas
proceeding was commenced by motions other than an application for a writ of
habeas corpus to protect rights equally fundamental to the right to counsel.
Nonetheless, the Court heavily emphasized the fundamental right at stake in
McFaari and used that concern to distinguish McFadad from W ooxfrd
2
Therefore, the Court may find a federal habeas proceeding began with a filing
other than the application for a writ of habeas corpus to protect a constitutional
right equally fundamental to the right to assistance of counsel
V. Ccrdwin
In Wc of* the Supreme Court indicated that a habeas claim may be
considered pending at different times for different purposes. This makes pre-
dicting when the Court will find a habeas complaint legally pending difficult.
Nonetheless, the net result of Won rI and McFadand appears to be that the
Court will only find that a habeas case has commenced at a time other than the
actual filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus to protect a fundamen-
tal right.
Maxwell C Smith
50. Id at 1402-03; Maraiar 512 US. at 857.
51. WoConf 123 S. Ct. at 1400; McFadvgn 512 US. at 851.
52. Sw WomfonA 123 S. Ct. at 1402-03 (distinguishing Mad 4; MaFadanr* 512 U.S. at
855-56 (enmhasizing the importance of counsel in habeas proceedings). "An attorneys assistance
prior to the Ing of a capital defendant's habeas corpus peitionis crucial, because It]he complexity
of our jurisprudence in this area... makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file
successful petitions for... without the assistance of persons learned in the law.'" McFadarn 512
US. at 855-56 (quoting Murrayv. Giartano, 492 US. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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